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NEW VARIATIONS ON THE RULE AGAINST PENALTIES: OPTIONS 
FOR NEW ZEALAND
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As a consequence of the rule against penalties, contractual clauses with a penal 
character are unenforceable. The rule has recently undergone significant revision 
in both the United Kingdom and Australia, following decisions by the highest 
courts in those jurisdictions. This article sets out and considers the options that 
those decisions put forward for the development of the rule against penalties in 
New Zealand. The variants are presented in terms of answers to two questions. The 
first is the “engagement question”: which kinds of contractual clauses are capable 
of being subject to the rule against penalties? At first glance, the English and 
Australian authorities present different answers to this question. However, we argue 
that their answer is essentially the same – the clause must be a secondary obligation 
triggered by failure to perform a contractual promise. We suggest the English 
framing of the engagement question should be followed in New Zealand, primarily 
because it is clearer. The second question is the “test question”: given that a clause 
engages the rule, what is the test for whether the clause is penal? The new cases 
are in agreement that a clause is a penalty if it is out of proportion to a legitimate 
interest in the performance of the contract, but two competing approaches emerge as 
to what can qualify as such an interest. We call the narrower approach the “bargain 
approach”; it focuses on interests that are protected by the parties’ bargain, and 
we argue it is preferable for this reason. However, on the broader approach, which 
we call the “party purposive approach”, the courts can look further to the innocent 
party’s motives for entering into the contract. This approach has overwhelming 
judicial support, and is more likely to be adopted in New Zealand. 
i. introDuction
A. Focus and Structure of this Paper
The rule against penalties1 is an ancient2 contract law doctrine that allows a 
court to find that certain contractual clauses are unenforceable. We will refer 
to such clauses as “penalties” or “penal”. The question whether a clause is 
penal usually arises in the context of agreed remedies clauses. Agreed remedies 
clauses state (or, at least, purport to state) what will happen when one party 
(the “breaching party” in contrast to the “innocent party”3) fails to perform a 
contractual obligation. Absent an agreed remedies clause, the question of what 
(if any) sums are payable following a particular breach is determined by the 
law of contract damages.4 Two points are clear. First, agreed remedies clauses 
* LLB(Hons), University of Otago.
** Lecturer in law, University of Otago.
1 Sometimes referred to as the “penalty rule” or “penalty doctrine”.
2 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [3] per 
Lords Neuberger and Sumption who stated that “The penalty rule in England is an ancient, 
haphazardly constructed edifice which has not weathered well …”.
3 References to the “breaching party” herein encompass breaches of primary obligations that 
may strictly be said not to constitute breach of contract.
4 More broadly, by the law relating to remedies for breach of contractual obligations. For the 
purposes of this article, we will focus on damages.
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that are a genuine pre-estimate of the loss that the innocent party will suffer 
because of the breach (“liquidated damages clauses”) are enforceable. Second, 
agreed remedies clauses that have been crafted for the purpose of punishing the 
breaching party by making them pay a sum far above and beyond any losses 
actually suffered by the innocent party are penalties. Articulating exactly where 
the line is drawn between the two has proven difficult.
Until relatively recently, courts operated on the basis of a dichotomy between 
liquidated damages clauses and clauses which went beyond compensating for 
loss and were held to be illegitimate deterrents.5 This follows Lord Dunedin’s 
classic statement in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor 
Co Ltd that: 6
The essence of a penalty is a payment of money stipulated as in terrorem of 
the offending party; the essence of liquidated damages is a genuine covenanted 
pre-estimation of damage. 
We will refer to this approach as the “traditional Dunlop approach”.
This orthodoxy has been disrupted by three recent decisions on the issue. 
Andrews and Paciocco are from the High Court of Australia and Cavendish and 
ParkingEye are a pair of cases that were decided together in the Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom.7 These recent developments in high-level appellate 
courts overseas raise the question how New Zealand should approach the issue. 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal in Torchlight8 had occasion, due to a choice 
of law clause,9 to consider and apply the new Australian formulation of the rule 
against penalties. Thus, the question of the future of the rule against penalties 
in New Zealand is still open. This paper will focus on identifying the possible 
approaches that New Zealand can adopt in light of the recent developments in 
Andrews, Paciocco and Cavendish.
With that goal in mind, there are some matters that fall outside the scope 
of this paper. We will not concern ourselves with the question of the correct 
interpretation of Dunlop, which can be re-read in light of these new decisions 
as having been consistent with them all along.10 The penalty rule has a long 
history and we will only touch on the history of the rule to the extent that it assists 
in elucidating and choosing between the versions of the rule that exist today. In 
5 See, for example, Alder v Moore [1961] 2 QB 57; Lordsvale Finance plc v Bank of Zambia 
[1996] QB 752. See generally Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, 
[2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [22]–[42] and Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 
152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [68]–[78].
6 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79 (HL) at 86. 
7 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30, (2012) 247 CLR 
205; Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28; Cavendish 
Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373. We will refer to 
Cavendish and ParkingEye collectively as “Cavendish”; references to ParkingEye draw 
specifically on the facts of that appeal. 
8 Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293. Leave to 
appeal to the Supreme Court was denied, see Torchlight Fund No 1 LP v Wilaci Pty Ltd [2017] 
NZSC 112.
9 Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [5] and [41].
10 See for example Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at 
[141]–[156]; Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293, 
at [79].
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particular, we take the position that the equitable heritage of the rule, through part 
of the legal history of the doctrine, is not of particular assistance with respect to 
determining how the rule should be configured in modern New Zealand.11 
In the course of argument in Cavendish, the question was raised whether 
the rule against penalties should operate at all, especially between commercial 
parties.12 We will assume that that position is untenable. That both the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom and the High Court of Australia have decided that 
the rule still serves a useful purpose suggests that New Zealand is likely to follow 
that approach. The more important discussion is where the rule draws the line.
ParkingEye and Paciocco also considered whether the clauses in question 
were in breach of consumer protection legislation.13 It may well be that some 
clauses that are not penalties will still be caught by New Zealand’s consumer 
protection laws,14 but the substance of those laws falls outside the scope of this 
article. Finally, we will not address whether penalty clauses are void in their 
entirety, as is the case in the United Kingdom,15 or partially enforceable, as is the 
case in Australia.16
The substantive content of the article is focused on two questions, and the 
options these questions provide for New Zealand.  The first is the “engagement 
question”: which sorts of clauses can be penalties? Not all clauses have the 
potential to be penalties. For example, someone who has got caught up in the 
excitement of an auction and over-bid on a house cannot have the contract set 
aside on the basis that the purchase price is so excessive that it is a penalty. Rather, 
to engage the rule against penalties, a clause must be triggered by a breach of 
some sort of contractual obligation. This question is a necessary preliminary 
question. However, New Zealand’s approach to it is likely to be uncontroversial. 
The second question is the “test question”: having established that a particular 
clause engages the rule against penalties, what is the test that the court must apply 
11 See Nettle J in Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at 
[252]: “Medieval religious scruples against usury associated with a primitive agrarian economy 
do not provide a satisfactory basis on which the penalty rule might now be sustained. Nor is the 
function of the penalty rule adequately explained by the concerns [of] courts of equity …”.
12 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [256]–
[260]. Essentially, the arguments against the rule were that it is contrary to freedom of contract, 
it only applies on breach, it can potentially be circumvented by clever drafting, it is uncertain, 
and it overlaps with consumer protection legislation. See also Jonathan Morgan “The Penalty 
Clause Doctrine: Unlovable But Untouchable” (2016) 75 CLJ 11 and David Hope “The Law 
on Penalties – A Wasted Opportunity” (2016) 33 JCL 93. Note also that the Court of Appeal 
in Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR at [91] stated 
that the rule against penalties would not lightly be deployed to set aside terms agreed by 
commercially astute entities.
13 Indeed, Lord Toulson would have decided the ParkingEye appeal in favour of the breaching 
party with reference to the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 (UK), see 
Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 [295]–[316]. 
14 For example, a term in a standard form consumer contract that is not penal might still be 
unenforceable on the basis that it has been declared to be an unfair contract term under the 
procedure set out in the Fair Trading Act 1986, ss 26A, 46H–46M. 
15 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373  at [85]–[88]. 
16 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30, (2012) 247 CLR 
205  at [10]. More specifically, the clause will be enforceable to the extent that it reflects the 
loss suffered by the innocent party as a result of the failure of the primary stipulation. We will 
explain this terminology in Part II.  
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to determine whether or not the clause actually is a penalty? This question poses 
the most difficult problem for New Zealand courts. 
This paper is divided into three parts. The first is this introductory section, 
which concludes by briefly setting out the facts and outcomes in the recent 
cases, clarifying that the rule against penalties is an inquiry into substance, 
and explaining the need for a new consideration of the penalty doctrine in 
New Zealand. Part II is concerned with the engagement question. That discussion 
focuses on whether a clause must be triggered by a breach of contract in order 
to be a penalty. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom and the High Court 
of Australia adopted apparently contradictory approaches on this issue, but we 
conclude that New Zealand will almost certainly adopt the United Kingdom’s 
approach. In practice, both approaches only allow clauses triggered by a failure 
to perform a primary obligation to engage the rule, but this is far clearer on 
the United Kingdom’s approach. Part III is concerned with the test question. 
We will argue that there are two competing approaches to the test question 
(which we call the “bargain approach” and the “party purposive approach”), and 
that New Zealand should adopt the former, despite the fact that the latter has 
overwhelming judicial support. 
B. The Recent Cases
1. Andrews
Andrews concerned fees that ANZ Bank charged its customers. The fees were 
triggered, inter alia, when a customer’s cheque bounced, or when a customer 
overdrew their account. The customers argued that the fees were penalties, while 
ANZ maintained they were enforceable. The Federal Court of Australia had held 
that some of these actions (or omissions) by the customer were not properly 
characterised as breaches of contract.17 The High Court of Australia concluded 
in Andrews that clauses which were not triggered by breach of contract could 
nevertheless engage the rule.18 The Court did not address whether the clauses 
were actually penalties.
2. Cavendish and ParkingEye
In Cavendish the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom delivered two concurrent 
judgments: Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi, and ParkingEye Ltd v 
Beavis. The Supreme Court rejected the approach to the engagement question 
taken in Andrews, and formulated its new approach to the test question.19 
The Cavendish appeal concerned the sale of a large company, and in particular 
the validity of two clauses which were triggered by breach of a restraint of trade 
clause by the seller. The first clause allowed the purchaser to withhold payments, 
while the second clause required the seller to sell his shares in the company to the 
purchaser. Some of the judges took different views as to whether the clauses in the 
sale contract were part of the parties’ primary obligations or whether they were 
17 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2011] FCA 1376, (2011) 211 FCR 
53 at [205]–[208].  
18 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30, (2012) 247 CLR 
205, at [10]. 
19 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [32], [152], 
[255]. 
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secondary obligations. Lords Neuberger, Sumption and Carnwath concluded that 
they were primary obligations and therefore the rule was not engaged.20 The other 
judges did not focus on whether the clauses were properly classified as primary or 
secondary, but rather concluded that they reflected the goodwill of the business, 
and were therefore in any event not out of proportion to a legitimate objective.21 
Overall, the court concluded that neither clause was a penalty. 
ParkingEye related to the operation of a car park. The terms of the car 
park contract allowed the customer two free hours of parking, but imposed 
an £85 fee on any customer who stayed for longer than two hours. Beavis 
overstayed the two-hour free parking period and was charged the fee, but 
claimed it was a penalty and was therefore unenforceable. Although it was 
accepted that ParkingEye suffered no loss from Beavis’ breach of contract, 
the Court concluded that the fee was not a penalty. This was in part because 
ParkingEye was entitled to have measures in place which ensured there would 
be spaces free for new customers. 
3. Paciocco
Paciocco was part of the same litigation with which Andrews was concerned. In 
Paciocco, the Court considered the validity of a single clause in one of ANZ’s 
credit card contracts with its customer, Paciocco. This clause required Paciocco 
to pay a fee of $20 (the fee was $35 prior to December 2009) if he was late 
making his payments on his credit card. The High Court of Australia concluded 
that the clause was not a penalty. Nettle J dissented, based on a different view 
of the test question.22 It was accepted that Paciocco was in breach of contract 
by being late in his payments, so Andrews was not directly relevant to the facts 
of Paciocco. 
The loss that ANZ suffered as a result of Paciocco’s late payment was 
relevant to the Court’s conclusion that the clause was not a penalty. Experts 
identified three categories of costs incurred by ANZ due to the late payment. 
The first category encompassed “operational costs” – the costs of ensuring that 
the payments Paciocco was required to make were actually made. These were 
largely costs incurred by staff in contacting the customers. The second category 
of costs was ANZ’s “increase in loss provisions”. This represented the reduction 
in the value to ANZ of Paciocco’s debt because of the increased risk that he 
would default. The third category was “increase in the cost of regulatory capital”. 
This represented the capital that ANZ needed to keep as a “buffer” which could 
be used by ANZ in the event that Paciocco defaulted.23 The second and third 
categories of loss would have been too remote for ANZ to recover had they 
sued Paciocco for breach of contract.24 However, a majority of the High Court 
20 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [74], 
[77], [83]. Primary obligations are the things the parties agree to perform, while secondary 
obligations are the obligations that arise on breach: Arthur Corbin “Discharge of Contracts” 
(1913) 22 YLJ 513 at 514.
21 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [181]–
[185], [278]–[280], [291], [292]. 
22 See discussion below at Part III, C The bargain approach.
23 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at [58]–[65].
24 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at [171]. 
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concluded that ANZ was nonetheless able to refer to these costs to justify the 
late payment fee.25 
4. Torchlight 
Torchlight Ltd entered into a loan agreement with Wilaci Ltd. Wilaci was to lend 
Torchlight $37m, for which Torchlight was to pay $5m, plus a further $320,000 
to reflect that Wilaci would be incurring interest charges to Credit Suisse, from 
whom it would borrow the money. The agreement provided for a late payment fee 
of $500,000 per week. Torchlight defaulted and sought to escape the obligation 
to pay the late payment fee. The principal issue on appeal was whether the late 
payment fee was an unenforceable penalty.26 
Muir J in the High Court of New Zealand, in a decision that is consistent 
with the traditional Dunlop approach27 – hardly surprising, since the decision 
was given prior to Cavendish and Paciocco – found that the late payment fee 
was penal.28 The Court of Appeal, applying Cavendish and Paciocco, reached 
the opposite result. The Court of Appeal framed the question whether the late 
payment fee was a penalty as being “whether the late payment fee is out of all 
proportion to any legitimate interest of Wilaci in due repayment … or, to put it 
another way, that the predominant purpose of the late payment fee is to punish.”29 
In determining the legitimate interest of Wilaci in repayment, the damages 
that Wilaci might have received had it sued on the primary obligation alone were 
of only limited relevance.30 Instead:31
[T]he legitimate interests of the lender will reflect a raft of considerations, 
including the value of the credit they provide, in the market in which it is 
provided, the level of risk to the [lender] both before and after default (which 
are likely to differ), costs of recovery, and opportunity and reputational costs 
(if any). The best measure of these considerations is the worth parties of even 
bargaining strength place on them in the transaction in issue. Even if the value of 
credit provided is assumed to be unchanged, the effect of default is normally to 
place a premium on the legitimate cost of credit post-default because of the other 
factors just enumerated.
In the context of this case, the Court of Appeal considered that Wilaci’s 
legitimate interest in the transaction could be measured by considering the total 
cost of credit assuming due performance. $5m plus $320,000 over 60 days is over 
25 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at [66] per Kiefel J 
(French CJ concurring), at [176] per Gageler J, and at [283] per Keane J.
26 Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [57]. 
Wilaci argued unsuccessfully that, on the true construction of the loan agreement, the “late 
payment fee” was effectively a price payable for the extension of the payment date, rather than 
a secondary obligation triggered by the breach of a primary obligation (ie the obligation to pay 
on time), see [48]–[56]. 
27 Torchlight Fund No 1 LP (in rec) v Johnstone [2015] NZHC 2559, see especially [167].
28 The fee was “simply an impost sufficiently draconian to concentrate Torchlight’s mind on 
the importance of timely repayment” (at [171]). As such, it was imposed in terrorem and its 
predominant function was deterrence, making it a penalty (at [172]).  Muir J expressed a degree 
of reluctance in making that finding at [172], but felt bound by the authorities.
29 Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [95].
30 Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [96]. 
31 Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [98].
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$88,000 per day.32 That $88,000 per day is effectively the price that Torchlight 
has paid for the use of Wilaci’s money; on the other side of the coin it is the daily 
rate of return to Wilaci for lending its money to Torchlight. That price/rate of 
return reflected a number of factors about the loan, including that it was a risky 
transaction for the lender and that Wilaci was not normally a commercial lender.33 
The cost of credit can then be compared with the cost of credit post-default. A 
late fee of $500,000 per week is over $71,000 per day – effectively the price of 
Torchlight keeping Wilaci’s money after the time when it was supposed to have 
paid it back. As the Court of Appeal observed, a distinctive feature of the case is 
that the loan agreement provided a reduced cost of credit post-default. Moreover, 
for the purposes of the rule against penalties, the late payment fee could not be 
said to be out of proportion to Wilaci’s legitimate interest in the transaction and 
therefore was not penal.34
C. An Inquiry into Substance
At this stage it is helpful to clarify that the inquiry into whether a clause is 
penal is, and always has been, a legal question concerned with substance. As the 
Court of Appeal put it in Torchlight, “[t]he real question is whether in substance 
the [clause in question] has the illegitimate qualities of an unenforceable 
penalty”.35 The outcome does not turn on the parties’ subjective intentions; it 
is not determined with reference to whether or not the parties actually intended 
the clause to be punitive, or a deterrent, or a genuine pre-estimate of damages 
in the event of breach.36 Since the penal (or non-penal) nature of a clause does 
not depend on the subjective intentions of the parties at the time it was drafted, 
clauses can be justified as non-penal post hoc. As long as the quantum of the 
clause in question is not extravagantly out of proportion with a legitimate 
interest, it does not matter that the quantum was not actually set with reference 
to that legitimate interest. The facts of Paciocco are illustrative: in court, ANZ 
identified various losses linked to late payment to justify the late payment fee, 
even though those losses had not actually been used to set its quantum.37
Nor does the penal nature of a clause turn on the description of the clause as 
“penal” or “not penal” by one or both parties (which may not always coincide with 
the parties’ subjective intentions).38  It is a long standing feature of the rule that 
the court can look through what the parties have labelled a liquidated damages 
clause and conclude that it is a penalty.39 By the same token, in Torchlight the 
Court of Appeal observed that “[c]haracterisation by a party of a payment as 
a ‘penalty’ in the course of negotiations has only modest significance”.40 This 
32 Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [99].
33 See Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [12]–
[13].
34 Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [100].
35 Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [33].
36  Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [206] HCA 28 at [243].
37 See Paciocco discussion above at n 23 and accompanying text.
38 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [15].
39 See, for example, Ford Motor Co v Armstrong (1915) 31 TLR 267 (CA).
40  Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [217] 3 NZLR 293 at [33].
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means that parties cannot circumvent the rule through “ingenious drafting”,41 
which would be possible if form prevailed over substance.
D. The Need for a New Approach in New Zealand 
When a New Zealand court comes to decide a case on penalty clauses, it is 
unlikely to retain the traditional Dunlop approach. The most recent New Zealand 
Court of Appeal decision on penalties applying New Zealand law was Amaltal 
Corporation Ltd v Maruha (NZ) Corporation Ltd, which still focused on the 
fact that penalty clauses are rendered unenforceable under a “branch of equity’s 
relief jurisdiction”.42 Burrows, Finn and Todd continue to explain the distinction 
between liquidated damages and a penalty in terms of whether the secondary 
obligation is “in the nature of a threat held over the other party in terrorem”, 
rather than being “a genuine pre-estimate of … loss”.43 However, this approach 
has been rejected in both the United Kingdom and Australia in favour of a focus 
on the performance interest (as will be explained further below) and it is likely 
that New Zealand courts will follow suit. 
The strongest signal from Torchlight that we can expect such a result is found 
in the Court of Appeal’s description of Dunlop (or, at least, the way Dunlop was 
subsequently treated) as “diverting” the development of the doctrine, leading 
to a subsequent “redirection” of the doctrine in Cavendish and Paciocco.44 
A New Zealand court would be able to adopt either the United Kingdom’s 
approach or Australia’s approach to the engagement question; and either the 
party purposive approach or the bargain approach to the test question. 
ii. the engAgement Question
A. The Different Approaches to the Engagement Question
The engagement question is concerned with which kinds of clauses have the 
potential to be penalties. Confirming that a clause engages the rule against 
penalties is a necessary but not sufficient requirement for a court finding that 
the clause is penal: the court must then go on and consider whether the clause is 
penal by applying the test, the substance of which is discussed in the next part 
of this paper. 
A penalty clause can be said to have two parts: a triggering event, and a 
resulting detriment imposed when the trigger condition occurs. To engage the 
rule against penalties, a clause must impose some kind of detriment on the 
breaching party. The detriment does not have to be an obligation to pay money 
to the innocent party,45 for example the innocent party could withhold payments 
that would otherwise be due to the breaching party. Cavendish and Andrews 
appear to differ on what kinds of triggering events will cause a clause to engage 
41 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [40]. 
42 Amaltal Corporation Ltd v Maruha (NZ) Corporation Ltd [2004] 2 NZLR 614 (CA) at [56]. 
43 John Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd Law of Contract in New Zealand (5th ed, 
LexisNexis, Wellington, 2016) at 853. 
44 Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293, see headings 
to [74] and [79].
45 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [154]–
[159]; Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30, (2012) 247 
CLR 205 at [12]. 
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the rule. The United Kingdom’s approach is the traditional one, maintaining the 
approach adopted in the earliest days of the rule against penalties: only clauses 
that are triggered by a breach of contract will engage the penalty rule. This is 
the approach that New Zealand courts will almost certainly adopt. In contrast, 
on the Australian approach, a clause need not be triggered by breach of contract 
to engage the rule. After explaining each approach we will compare the two, and 
conclude that, although on the face of it the two jurisdictions adopt contradictory 
stances,46 in practice there will probably be little difference in the application of 
each test.
The strongest piece of evidence we have that New Zealand courts are more 
likely to follow the Cavendish approach to the engagement question is that that 
is exactly what happened in Torchlight, despite the relevant law being that of 
New South Wales! Kós P stated that the essential question regarding engagement 
of the rule against penalties was:47
whether the late payment fee is a primary obligation — that is, a payment for 
further funding accommodation — or a secondary obligation conditional on, and 
responsive to, default.
This formulation of the test for the engagement question is consistent with 
the Cavendish approach, under which the penalty rule is only engaged by clauses 
that are triggered by breach of contract;48 that is, a failure to do something that 
the breaching party promised to do, whether or not the words “I promise” are 
actually used. 
In contrast, on the Australian approach, a clause need not be triggered by 
a breach of contract to engage the rule against penalties. The High Court of 
Australia stated that:49
In general terms, a stipulation prima facie imposes a penalty on a party (‘the first 
party’) if, as a matter of substance, it is collateral (or accessory) to a primary 
stipulation in favour of a second party and this collateral stipulation, upon the 
failure of the primary stipulation, imposes upon the first party an additional 
detriment, the penalty, to benefit the second party. In that sense, the collateral or 
accessory stipulation is described as being in the nature of a security for and in 
terrorem of the satisfaction of the primary stipulation.
This test is somewhat convoluted, so we will explain it in some detail.
The first part of the test refers to primary and collateral “stipulations”. Here, 
“stipulation” is another way of saying “contractual term” and encompasses 
contractual terms in general rather than only those that contain promises. This 
46 The approach in Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30, 
(2012) 247 CLR 205 was rejected in Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 
67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [42]. Cavendish was rejected in turn in Paciocco v Australia and 
New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28, at [121]–[123]. 
47 Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [42].
48 Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [41]-[42].
49 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30, (2012) 247 CLR 205 
at [10]. The text above is followed by the following sentences: “If compensation can be made 
to the second party for the prejudice suffered by failure of the primary stipulation, the collateral 
stipulation and the penalty are enforced only to the extent of that compensation. The first party is 
relieved to that degree from liability to satisfy the collateral stipulation.” We read this part of the 
paragraph as providing a broad outline of how the rule against penalties works when a clause is 
penal, as opposed to adding anything to the question of when the rule is engaged.
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allows the rule against penalties to apply to clauses that are not triggered by 
breach of contract. In particular, it extends to what we will call “alternative 
stipulations”, where a party agrees to perform one of two alternatives, but has 
not failed to do something that they promised simply by failing to perform one. 
Andrews was a case that featured paired alternative stipulations. 
The Australian test introduces the idea that some paired alternative stipulations 
will feature one “primary” stipulation and another which is “accessory” or 
“collateral” to the primary stipulation. This will only be the case for some paired 
alternative stipulations. For example, a promise to deliver either a green or a 
blue version of a car would normally be understood as putting forward true equal 
alternatives rather than a primary stipulation and an accessory one. Clauses that 
offer true equal alternatives do not engage the rule.
The Court provided no express guidance on how to determine which stipulation 
is primary.50 Since the collateral stipulation functions as “security” for the primary 
stipulation,51 it follows that the primary stipulation is the real objective that the 
innocent party is trying to achieve, while the collateral stipulation ensures that 
purpose is achieved, or functions as a second-best-alternative substitute. That is, 
the collateral stipulation is not what the innocent party is really trying to achieve 
or hoping will occur. In the context of the banking charges referred to in Andrews, 
one might think the objective purpose of the paired stipulations is to prevent the 
customer from taking their account into overdraft. Thus, the stipulation requiring 
the customer to keep their account in credit will be the primary stipulation. The 
overdraft fee is therefore the collateral stipulation. 
It seems, then, that determining whether paired stipulations are primary and 
secondary as opposed to true alternatives, and, if so, which is the primary 
stipulation, is a question of construction. Of course, the parties’ own labelling of 
one stipulation as primary will not be determinative.52 
The next part of the Andrews test is satisfied if, on the failure of the primary 
stipulation, the collateral stipulation confers an “additional detriment” on the 
first party (the breaching party) to the benefit of the second party (the innocent 
party). This raises the question “additional to what?” The most sensible answer 
is: “additional to the detriment that would normally follow from a failure of the 
primary stipulation”. This part of the test involves an evaluative exercise as it 
requires comparison between the detriment following from the failure of the 
primary stipulation and the detriment imposed by the collateral stipulation.
50 In the context of breach of contract, it will be clear that the primary stipulation is the promise, 
and the collateral stipulation is the fee payable on breach. 
51 Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2012] HCA 30, (2012) 247 CLR 
205 at [10].
52 See Waterside Workers’ Federation of Australia v Stewart (1919) 27 CLR 119 (HCA). In 
that case, the Workers’ Federation executed a bond where one stipulation required them to 
pay £500 to the employer, and the alternative stipulation required them to pay £50 on every 
occasion that its member workers went on strike. It seems the court might conclude the purpose 
of the bond was to require the Workers’ Federation to pay £50 if the workers went on strike – 
the alternative undertaking to pay £500 seems to have been designed to ensure the Federation 
actually did pay out the £50. However, the agreement was framed as if the debt of £500 was 
the primary stipulation. This was the normal way in which penal bonds were structured (see 
Samuel Williston A Treatise on the Law of Contracts (4th ed, Lawyers Cooperative, Rochester 
(NY), 2000) at §42:15). See also Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd 
[2016] HCA 28 at [243].
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The requirement for an “additional detriment” prevents the rule against 
penalties from being engaged by exclusion or limitation clauses, which are 
agreed remedies clauses that provide that the breaching party’s liability is less 
than that which would normally follow failure of the primary stipulation. This 
reflects modern courts’ acceptance of exclusion and limitation clauses as a 
normal and acceptable part of contracting.53 
B. Comparing the Approaches
In comparing the two approaches to the engagement question, the first point 
worth noting is that the Australian approach goes further in terms of what the 
court must consider. Simply that a clause is triggered by a breach of contract 
is enough, on the Cavendish approach, to engage the rule against penalties. 
The Andrews approach, if taken seriously, requires a court to go further and 
consider whether the clause imposes an additional detriment, which requires 
consideration of the losses suffered on failure of the primary obligation. That 
consideration under the Cavendish approach falls under the test question.
Putting this difference to one side, at first glance it seems that the Australian 
approach can capture a class of clauses which would fall outside the United 
Kingdom’s approach. This is because on the Australian approach the clause 
need not be triggered by breach of contract to engage the rule. In our view, 
the same clauses will engage both rules. In Cavendish, the Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom concluded that paired alternate stipulations cannot engage 
the rule against penalties.54 However, the Supreme Court provided a qualification 
to the idea that paired stipulations can never engage the rule, which is that the 
rule is concerned with substance rather than form and is not defeated by clever 
drafting.55 Therefore, the United Kingdom’s approach can apply to clauses 
that are labelled alternative stipulations by the parties, so long as in truth they 
represent a promise and a secondary obligation that applies on breach. On the 
Australian approach the rule will only be engaged by secondary obligations that 
are triggered by the breach of a promise. 
On the Australian test, the primary stipulation represents a purpose of the 
contract, and the collateral stipulation is included to ensure the purpose is 
carried out. In the Andrews banking contract, the purpose of the clauses is 
to require the customer to keep the account in credit. Concluding that one 
contractual stipulation is primary and the other exists to ensure it is satisfied 
is no different to concluding that one stipulation is a promise and the other is 
a liability triggered by breach. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom 
decided not to adopt the Andrews test, in part because it considered that doing 
so would stray too close to interfering with the parties’ primary obligations.56 
However, the primary/secondary structure built into the Australian approach 
addresses that same concern. Lords Neuberger and Sumption wrote that the 
“analysis [in Andrews] assumes that the ‘primary stipulation’ is some kind of 
53 John Burrows, Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd, Law of Contract in New Zealand (5th ed, 
LexisNexis, Wellington, 2016) at 234. 
54 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [14] and 
see [40].
55 See discussion above at Part I, C Inquiry into substance.
56 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [42]. 
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promise, in which case its failure is necessarily a breach of that promise”.57 
Similarly, Corbin explains that a primary stipulation in the context of the 
bond cases has “come to be regarded as a promise that the condition will be 
performed”.58  Just as the courts can look beyond the language that the parties 
have used, we can look beyond the language that the courts use and conclude 
that, in substance, they are concerned with the same thing. Thus, the only 
practical difference between the approaches will be that the clause must on the 
Australian test impose an “additional detriment”.
For this reason, in our view, New Zealand courts are more likely to follow 
the United Kingdom’s approach to the engagement question than the Australian 
approach. The United Kingdom’s approach is clearer, easier to understand, and 
is the approach that has traditionally applied to clauses that are challenged as 
penalties. It is for these same reasons that we prefer it to the Australian approach. 
Leaving to one side the evaluative element of the Australian approach, both 
tests will operate to exclude the same clauses. In the absence of a material 
difference between the approaches, the test which is easiest to understand and 
apply should be adopted, as this will make it clearer to commercial parties in 
which circumstances the rule will be engaged. The United Kingdom’s test is 
by far the clearer of the two.59 Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s approach 
makes it immediately apparent that the test will only respond to secondary 
obligations. This is not at all clear on the Australian approach.
iii. the test Question
A. Introduction
Having concluded that the penalty rule is engaged by a particular clause, the 
court must go on to consider whether or not the clause in question is actually 
penal. This Part considers the test for that question, and the two options 
that emerge. Cavendish and Paciocco both rejected the traditional Dunlop 
57 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [42]. 
58 Arthur Corbin Corbin on Contracts (West Publishing Co, St Paul, 1964) vol 6 at 1056. Waterside 
Workers’ Federation of Australia v Stewart (1919) 27 CLR 119 (HCA) is an example.
59 In fact, we consider it could be stated even more clearly; see the conclusion to this paper. 
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dichotomy.60 Instead, both decisions put forward a new approach, involving two 
considerations:61
• What is the innocent party’s legitimate interest in performance62 in the 
primary obligation?; and
• Is the consequence of triggering the clause for the breaching party so 
extravagantly out of proportion with that interest that it must be seen as 
punitive and therefore a penalty?
Neither court gives much guidance on how far out of proportion a secondary 
obligation must be with the legitimate interest in performance before it becomes 
a penalty, especially considering that neither Cavendish nor Paciocco provide a 
positive example of a penalty clause.63 What is clear from both Cavendish and 
Paciocco is that the threshold is a high one.64 
The points of controversy and uncertainty over the test question are mostly 
concerned with exactly how to go about identifying (and placing a value on) 
the innocent party’s “legitimate interest in performance”. Two competing 
approaches emerge from the cases. The majority of judges in both Cavendish 
and Paciocco adopt what we refer to as the “party purposive approach”, while 
Nettle J’s dissent in Paciocco puts forward what we will refer to as the “bargain 
approach”. 
We will introduce the idea of the “performance interest” in general terms that 
apply to both approaches before setting out and contrasting the bargain and party 
purposive approaches, and the way we argue that New Zealand should respond. 
The bargain approach and the party purposive approach diverge on two connected 
aspects to determining the innocent party’s interest in performance: when the 
innocent party has an interest in the consequences of performance; and the extent 
to which the judicial remedies available are an important reference point to the 
60 See Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [31] 
and Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at [30].  
61 Broadly speaking, these same two considerations can be found in all the judgments in 
Cavendish and Paciocco. Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 
3 WLR 1373  at [32], at [152] per Lord Mance, at [255] per Lord Hodge. Paciocco v Australia 
and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at [29] per Kiefel J (with whom French 
CJ agreed), at [270] per Keane J who applies Lord Hodge’s test from Cavendish, and Nettle J 
at [319]–[321]. Gageler J’s test is worth remarking upon as it was formulated somewhat 
differently. Gageler J focused on whether the exclusive purpose of the clause was to punish 
([158]). We agree with Kós P’s observation in Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] 
NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [88] that Gageler J’s approach is “not so far removed” 
from the majority, considering that at [164] Gageler J stated that: “The relevant indicator of 
punishment lies in the negative incentive to perform being so far out of proportion with the 
positive interest in performance that the negative incentive amounts to deterrence by threat of 
punishment.” That is, that the only purpose of the clause is punishment is a conclusion reached 
from working through the two considerations, not a stand-alone requirement or determination 
that must be made before a clause can be found to be penal.
62 As the decisions do, we will use “interest in performance” and “performance interest” 
interchangeably.
63 Although Nettle J did dissent, see discussion below at Part III, C The bargain approach.
64 “[E]xtravagant, exorbitant or unconscionable” per Lord Mance in Cavendish Square Holding 
BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373  at [152], see also the judgments of 
Lords Hodge and Toulson at [255] and [293]. As Lord Hodge put it at [266], “the criterion 
of exorbitance or unconscionableness should prevent the enforcement of only egregious 
contractual provisions”.  See also Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 
152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [87]. 
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inquiry. The bargain approach focuses on interests that are protected in the parties’ 
bargain, while the party purposive approach focuses on the subjective interests 
of the innocent party. We prefer the bargain approach. As we will conclude, 
the party purposive approach allows the innocent party retrospectively to gain 
interests that they did not bargain for, which is not consistent with contract law 
as a whole. 
After explaining which approach we consider New Zealand should adopt, we 
will explain why, in our view, New Zealand courts are likely to adopt the party 
purposive approach to the test question, rather than the bargain approach. It has 
overwhelming judicial support across Cavendish and Paciocco and, furthermore, 
is consistent with the courts’ approaches to determining the performance interest 
in the context of damages. Finally, we will address exactly what it means that 
the innocent party’s interest in performance must be “legitimate”, which is a 
requirement of both approaches. 
B. The Performance Interest
The phrase “the performance interest” was first coined by Daniel Friedman in 
1995.65 Friedman argued that the law of contractual remedies should take as its 
foundational principle that contracts are made to be performed. Accordingly, 
remedies for breach should be aimed at granting the innocent party performance 
or a substitute.66
In the present context, we suggest that it can be helpful to think of the 
performance interest as being a kind of bundle of different interests, all of which 
can be described as interests that the innocent party has acquired as a result 
of contract formation.67 The values of these interests can be used as reference 
points and compared to the fee imposed by a purported penalty clause when 
determining whether it is penal.
First and foremost, the performance interest includes an interest in 
performance of the primary obligations under the contract. For example, in a 
construction contract the customer will have an interest in timely completion, as 
well as an interest in the actual construction itself, if the builder promised timely 
completion.
Second, the performance interest can encompass the consequences of 
performance. That is, the innocent party can be said to acquire, by contracting, 
interests in accruing benefits that would follow performance and interests in 
avoiding disbenefits that performance prevents. For example, a party may have 
bargained for performance by a particular date because they expected to sell 
for a profit, or so as to avoid breaching a contract themselves and incurring 
liability. Because the performance interest can look beyond the obligations 
specified in the contract to the consequences of performance, it can be seen 
as providing a measure of protection for the innocent party’s objectives or 
motives for contracting. As we will discuss further below,68 there is room 
for disagreement as to exactly when the performance interest extends to the 
65 Daniel Friedman “The Performance Interest in Contract Damages” (1995) 111 LQR 628.
66 Daniel Friedman “The Performance Interest in Contract Damages” (1995) 111 LQR at 629.
67 As will be explained further below, the cases diverge on the extent to which the innocent party 
will have an interest in the consequences of performance. 
68 This is a point of difference between the bargain and party purposive approaches and is also 
part of a broader conflict, see “Broader conflict” below at Part III, E.
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consequences of performance, and the extent to which the innocent party’s 
objectives or motives are relevant.
Third, the performance interest can encompass substitutes for performance, 
since, upon contract formation the parties can be said to acquire an interest in 
performance or some appropriate alternative to performance.69 The interest in a 
substitute for performance is acquired at the time of contract formation, but 
is conditional on breach. The extent and quantum of the performance interest 
generated by a contract can therefore be considered in terms of substitutes for 
performance as opposed to performance. What qualifies as an alternative to 
performance can be informed by, but is not necessarily limited to, the remedies 
that a court can award. This is because damages awards are (usually) how 
the law gives the innocent party a substitute for performance, although “[t]he 
availability of remedies for a breach of duty is not simply a question of providing 
a financial substitute for performance … it engages broader social and economic 
considerations”.70 
An interest in a substitute for performance can also extend to a substitute 
for the consequences that should have followed performance. For example, the 
law of contractual remedies allows parties in certain circumstances to recover 
losses consequential on breach. However, it is conceivable that an innocent 
party may have an interest in a consequence of performance but no interest in a 
substitute for that consequence in the event of breach because there is no suitable 
substitute. For example, it could be said that ParkingEye acquired an interest 
in the regular freeing up of spaces that is the consequence of car park users 
vacating their spots in time as promised. However, the acquisition of that interest 
does not necessarily mean that ParkingEye acquires an interest in a substitute for 
performance. Because the failure to achieve the consequence resulted in no loss, 
there was arguably no suitable substitute for performance. However, the absence 
of an interest in a substitute for car park circulation does not rule out ParkingEye 
using an overstay fee to deter breach, because an interest in the consequence in 
question, not an interest in a substitute, can justify the overstay fee.
C. The Bargain Approach
The bargain approach was adopted by Nettle J in Paciocco. The essence of 
the bargain approach is that, out of the set of interests that could conceivably 
be described as part of the performance interest,71 only those interests that are 
properly understood as being interests that are protected by the parties’ bargain 
are legitimate interests in performance that could justify a purported penalty.72 
There are two ways in which an interest can be protected by a contract, on this 
view. The first is that, on an objective construction of the contract, the breaching 
party has taken responsibility for providing the interest. That will usually be 
where the interest is one in performance of a primary obligation, for example 
timely completion of a building job, but will also include cases where, as a 
matter of construction, the breaching party has taken responsibility for certain 
consequences of performance, for example, compensating a homeowner for 
69 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [32].
70 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [29].
71 That is, interests in the performance of the primary obligations, interests in the consequences of 
performance, and interests in substitutes for performance.
72 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28  at [331].
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lost rent as a result of late completion. The second is that the interest is one for 
which a court is likely to award damages.
An interest will often be protected in both senses. For example, a builder 
who has been promised payment by a customer has that interest protected 
in the sense that they have an interest in the performance of payment and also in 
the sense that a court is likely to award damages if payment does not occur. As a 
result, the bargain approach takes the position that the damages that a court might 
award for breach of a promise will normally reflect the value of the interest that 
the innocent party has in performance. Accordingly, as a general rule, if a fee on 
breach is grossly disproportionate to the damages that the court might award, it 
will be a penalty.73 
However, there will be some cases where the breaching party fails to provide 
an interest it was required to provide under the contract but this is unlikely to 
result in an award of damages, because it is not accompanied by a material loss 
or there is a material loss but it is difficult to quantify. These sorts of cases require 
an exception to the general rule.74 In exceptional cases where the contract protects 
an interest in performance broader than what can easily be translated into an award 
of damages, the parties can set a value themselves to incentivise or substitute 
for performance, as long as the value that they agree upon is not extortionate.75 
Nettle J gives ParkingEye, Dunlop and Clydebank76 as examples. With respect 
to ParkingEye, Nettle J concluded that it was an “agreed fact” that the purpose 
of the parking overstay fee was to allow other members of the public to have a 
chance at using the parking spaces.77 That is, ParkingEye acquired an interest in 
keeping spaces available for other customers under the contract. Accordingly, even 
though the interest was not accompanied by a material loss, ParkingEye could 
use an overstay fee as a deterrent to try and achieve the interest that they had 
bargained for. Dunlop and Clydebank are explained as cases where the innocent 
party acquired an interest that did coincide with some material loss, but not one 
that was easy to quantify. Accordingly, the parties could agree on a value.
Nettle J’s approach to the facts of Paciocco is illustrative of the bargain 
approach in operation. ANZ sought to justify its late payment fee as reflecting 
several categories of loss.78 The customer had not agreed to protect ANZ from 
these losses under the contract. Only one of those categories would have been 
recoverable as damages for breach of contract, as the others were too remote.79 
Accordingly, that loss was the only one protected by the contract and the only 
loss that could properly be regarded as part of ANZ’s performance interest. The 
remote losses were ones that ANZ could be said to have an interest in avoiding, 
but that interest was not part of the bundle of interests that ANZ effectively 
purchased under the contract. On Nettle J’s view of the evidence, the damages 
recoverable by the bank due to the late payment would have been $6.90. His 
73 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at [331], [333]. 
74 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at [331], [333]. 
75 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at [324].
76 Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co v Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo y Castaneda [1905] 
AC 6 (HL). Clydebank was concerned with what losses could be said to have resulted from a 
delay in constructing warships for Spain. 
77 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at [325].
78 See Part I, B The recent cases, above, for the full facts.
79 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at [171]. 
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Honour considered that the $20 late payment fee was “grossly disproportionate” 
to this figure and therefore a penalty.80
We consider that the bargain approach is pragmatic in the way that it 
compares the innocent party’s interest in performance to the damages they 
would be awarded on breach. This approach is also consistent with contract law 
as a whole, because it focuses on interests that are communicated to the other 
party, are objectively apparent, and as such form part of the parties’ bargain. The 
parties can be said to have bargained for these interests, and they are entitled to 
protect them. Contract law is usually concerned with enforcing terms which are 
the subject of mutual agreement. Consistently with this, interests that are not part 
of the parties’ bargain cannot be referred to in order to justify a purported penalty 
on this approach. 
D. The Party Purposive Approach
The interests that the party purposive approach is concerned with are not limited to 
those that are protected under the contract. This means that a purported penalty can 
be justified with reference to an interest that is neither one for which the breaching 
party took responsibility under the contract nor one that is likely to give rise to 
a damages award. Accordingly, whatever damages might be awarded had the 
innocent party sued on the primary obligation alone is of only limited relevance.81 
We consider that this is not a good fit with contract law principles in general. 
The majority approaches in both Paciocco and Cavendish are illustrative 
of the focus on the innocent party’s purposes and interests. In Paciocco, the 
majority were concerned with “interests” in the sense of things that ANZ was 
interested in, rather than focusing on things that ANZ was interested in that they 
had protected under the contract. Keane J was most explicit about spelling out 
what ANZ’s interests were. His Honour decided that ANZ had an interest in 
making a profit, and concluded that the fact that a provision achieves a profit 
for the innocent party at the expense of the breaching party will not make that 
clause penal.82 His Honour explained that the bank could operate more profitably 
if customers paid on time, both because it could reinvest the funds which would 
otherwise have been paid late, and could reduce the cost of its services to all 
customers, and thereby secure more customers and higher revenues.83 Further, 
his Honour concluded that the bank was entitled to a “reward” for the risk it 
took on in granting the loans.84 These reasons justified ANZ charging a fee for 
late payment, and the justification did not turn on those interests being protected 
under the contract. The other judges in Paciocco also referred to ANZ’s interests, 
but were less explicit in identifying exactly what its interests were.85 The Court 
80 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 [321]–[322].
81 Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293at [96].
82 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at [221]. 
83 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at [278]. 
84 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at [278]. 
85  Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at [66] per Kiefel J, 
at [176] per Gageler J. 
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also concluded that the clause could be justified with reference to losses which 
would be too remote to recover in an action for breach of contract.86 
The same focus is evident in ParkingEye. The Supreme Court of the 
United Kingdom referred to ParkingEye’s “objectives” which justified charging 
a late stayer fee, although these objectives were not referred to in the contract 
itself. The Court decided that the parking charge had two main objectives: to 
“manage the efficient use of the parking in the interests of the retail outlets” 
(by deterring “misuse”); and to provide income which would allow ParkingEye 
to meet its costs and make a profit.87 Because ParkingEye had a legitimate 
interest that extended beyond recovery of loss, and the clause was not out of 
proportion to that interest, the clause was not penal.88 Again, this approach looks 
at ParkingEye’s interests qua interests, rather than testing whether the interests 
were contracted for. This is in contrast to Nettle J’s view that the purpose of the 
clause in ParkingEye was an “agreed fact”.89 
The party purposive approach allows the innocent party retrospectively to 
gain interests that they did not bargain for. It allows “adjudication of parties’ 
individual motivations that are not necessarily the subject of mutual agreement”, 
as Jessica Palmer put it.90  That is fundamentally inconsistent with how contract 
law ought to do things, and how contract law generally does do things. Whether 
a clause is penal can be seen as a question of construction.91  But, contractual 
construction is concerned with determining the objective intentions of the 
parties,92 not the subjective intentions or motivations that one party might have 
86 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at [66] per Kiefel J 
(French CJ concurring), at [176] per Gageler J, and at [283] per Keane J. We will address this 
in more detail below.
87 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [98].
88 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [99]–[100] 
per Lords Neuberger and Sumption. See also [198] per Lord Mance; and [287] per Lord Hodge. 
Lords Cornwath, Clarke and Toulson concurred. 
89 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at [325]. 
90 Jessica Palmer “Implications of the New Rule Against Penalties” (2016) 47(2) VUWLR 305 at 
324. Palmer suggests that recent developments show that the law is getting dangerously close 
to doing so. We say it does.
91 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [9], Wilaci 
Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [7].
92 Firm PI 1 Ltd v Zurich Australian Insurance and Body Corporate 398983 [2014] NZSC 147, 
[2015] 1 NZLR 432 at [60], Arnold v Britton  [2015] UKSC 36, [2015] AC 1619 at [15]. Both 
decisions endorse Lord Hoffmann’s statement that a Court is to identify the parties’ intentions 
with reference to “what a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would 
have been available to the parties would have understood them to be using the language in the 
contract to mean”, see Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society 
[1998] 1 WLR 896 (HL) at 912 and Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38 
[2009] 1 AC 1101 at [14].
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had.93 Similarly, terms are implied in fact if they are necessary to make the 
contract work, not just because they seem reasonable or are necessary to achieve 
what one of the parties wanted.94 
E. The Primacy of the Party Purposive Approach in Light of the Broader 
Conflict Over the Performance Interest
Although we consider the party purposive approach is a poor fit with contract 
law in general, we suggest it is more likely to be adopted in New Zealand than 
the bargain approach. 
The Court of Appeal gave no express indication as to the desirability of 
adopting the Australian approach in New Zealand, although, in giving the 
judgment of the Court, Kós P referred to Paciocco as giving “a significantly 
greater measure of clarity to the doctrine of penalties in Australia”,95 and was 
readily able to apply the party purposive approach to the facts of the case. 
The fact that the party purposive approach was adopted by all but one of the 
judges across the recent cases we have considered is a strong indication that 
New Zealand is likely to adopt it. 
Furthermore, the party purposive approach conforms with a trend that has 
developed in a broader conflict over the scope of the performance interest in 
contract law. We will examine that broader conflict now. 
As Palmer put it, the performance interest has “been explicitly recognised 
and incorporated into the law on contractual damages”.96 In the context of 
damages, the performance interest is most frequently referred to when the court 
decides whether to award the “diminution in value” or “cost of cure” measure 
following a breach of contract. Diminution in value reflects the difference 
between the value of the performance that has been completed and the value of 
the performance that was promised. Cost to cure reflects the cost of remedying 
the defective performance. 
The leading New Zealand case on the issue, Altimarloch,97 illustrates 
the broader conflict between two competing approaches to determining the 
performance interest. That case concerned the sale of a property which the 
purchaser intended to use for growing grapes. The vendor made a misrepresentation 
about the water rights that came with the property: the property actually came 
93 Arnold v Britton  [2015] UKSC 36, [2015] AC 1619 at [15] and Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight 
Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [7]. But, note that one of the pieces 
of “admissible, relevant and necessary background matrix” material the Court sets out at [22] 
is an email from Mr Grill, who controlled Wilaci, to an analyst he had engaged to undertake 
due diligence. That email certainly sheds light on what Mr Grill was seeking to achieve, but 
it is questionable whether it should be admissible for the purposes of determining the parties’ 
intention, as it appears to be subjective in the sense that it is private to one of the parties. See 
also at [24] the similar mention of an email to Mr Kerr, who controlled Torchlight, from a 
financial adviser of his.
94 Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd v Development Auckland Ltd [2016] NZSC 89, [2017] 1 NZLR 48 
at [79]–[80]; Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) 
Ltd [2015] UKSC 72, [2016] L & TR 8 at [23].
95 Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [41]. 
96 Jessica Palmer “Implications of the New Rule Against Penalties” (2016) 47(2) VUWLR 305 
at 322.
97 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 11, [2012] 2 
NZLR 726.
1106 Vol 27New Zealand Universities Law Review
with much less access to water than the vendor promised. To provide the missing 
water rights the majority held that additional rights would have to be bought 
from neighbouring properties and a dam would need to be built. This meant the 
cost of cure was over $1m. In contrast, the diminution in value was $125,000; 
the property would have been worth $2.675m with the water rights, but was only 
worth $2.55m without them.98
The majority in the Supreme Court awarded the cost to cure, rather than the 
diminution in value, in large part because their analysis of the performance interest 
focused on the purchaser’s motives for buying the property. McGrath J noted 
that “[t]he importance to the purchaser of the representations as to the extent of 
the water rights arose from its intention to develop a vineyard on the land”.99 On 
this view of the performance interest, an award which compensated the plaintiff 
for the diminution in value would be insufficient to put him in the position he 
would have been in had the contract been performed – it would not have allowed 
him to acquire the necessary water to grow grapes. Clearly, the innocent party’s 
motive in entering the contract was relevant to the Court’s determination that 
diminution in value was not the appropriate damages measure, even though that 
motive was not specified in the contract. Therefore, the majority’s concept of 
the performance interest takes into account similar considerations to the party 
purposive approach.100 
In contrast, Elias CJ’s approach in Altimarloch is consistent with the 
bargain approach. Her Honour adopted a narrower approach to calculating the 
performance interest, which led her to prefer the diminution in value measure.101 
Her Honour concluded that the purchaser’s performance interest was merely the 
right to receive a property of a certain value, writing:102
the contract in the present case was one for the purchase of land, in respect of 
which a market existed and value could be objectively assessed to reflect the 
breach of warranty… The construction of a storage dam for water in the present 
case is not stipulated performance under the contract. 
The Chief Justice’s approach is consistent with Nettle J’s judgment because 
her Honour focused on the wording of the contract itself, and did not consider the 
innocent party’s broader motives and interests. Her Honour held that because the 
purchaser had not stipulated for construction of a dam in the contract, awarding 
the cost of building a dam would not produce conformity with the contract.103 
The Chief Justice also held that it would be unreasonable to award the cost of 
98 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 11, [2012] 
2 NZLR 726 at [4]–[9].
99 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 11, [2012] 
2 NZLR 726 at [192]. 
100 See also Tabcorp Holdings Ltd v Bowen Investments Pty Ltd (2009) 236 CLR 272 (HCA) and 
Clark v Macourt (2013) 304 ALR 220 (HCA) for two further examples of the same sort of 
reasoning used to justify a cost of cure award.
101 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 11, [2012] 
2 NZLR 726 at [45]. 
102 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 11, [2012] 
2 NZLR 726 at [37]. 
103 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 11, [2012] 
2 NZLR 726 at [37]. 
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cure.104 Unlike the majority, Elias CJ did not attach any weight to the fact that the 
purchaser intended to use the property to grow grapes, as this was not specified 
in the contract.
F. Legitimacy 
“Legitimacy” is a common requirement of both the bargain approach and the party 
purposive approach105 – it will be a feature of the New Zealand test regardless of 
which approach the courts adopt. However, none of the recent cases give much 
express guidance on what the “legitimacy” requirement actually means. One 
possibility is that the requirement that the interest be legitimate is a “nebulous 
exception”, which allows the court to reserve the right to strike out a clause 
as “illegitimate”, but where the reasons for doing so are apparent to the court 
alone.106 We will discount that possibility, and search for a more satisfactory 
one. Given the case law, some interests are clearly not illegitimate. These 
include deterring breach,107 making a profit108 and, given that making a profit is 
not illegitimate, perhaps even betterment.109 Clearly, punishment for breach is 
illegitimate, but it is unclear precisely what (if anything) the requirement means 
beyond that.
It might be tempting to explain the requirement for a “legitimate interest 
in performance” as meaning that the innocent party must have a good reason 
to prefer performance to the normal consequences of non-performance, which 
are that they can sue the breaching party for damages.110 So, in ParkingEye, the 
innocent party has a good reason to prefer performance to damages because they 
had suffered no material loss and would receive nothing in damages. Accordingly, 
the innocent party can legitimately set a non-extortionate fee for breach to try and 
secure performance. However, that cannot be a satisfactory explanation for the 
requirement of legitimacy. First, we have effectively substituted the requirement 
of legitimacy for one of a “good reason”, without explaining what makes a 
reason “good”. Furthermore, while it might be apt for cases like ParkingEye, this 
account of legitimacy is too narrow because not all clauses that might engage the 
104 Marlborough District Council v Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd [2012] NZSC 11, [2012] 
2 NZLR 726 at [39]. 
105 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [32], [152] 
and [249]; Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at [271] 
per Keane J, and at [322] per Nettle J. Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 
152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [88].
106 Rex Ahdar “Contract Doctrine, Predictability and the Nebulous Exception” (2014) 73 CLJ 39 
at 42.
107 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [248] per 
Lord Hodge.  Many legitimate contractual provisions are coercive in nature. See Wilaci Pty Ltd 
v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293 at [97].
108 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [32], [152] 
and [249]; Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28 at [271] 
per Keane J, and at [322] per Nettle J.
109 Although Francis Dawson argued betterment would make an interest illegitimate, in 
“Determining Penalties as a Matter of Construction” (2016) LMCLQ 207 at 213, this would 
seem to be inconsistent with the result in Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking 
Group Ltd [2016] HCA 28.
110 See, for example, Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 
1373 at [28].
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rule against penalties are best understood as seeking to secure performance. In 
some cases, the innocent party might be equally happy to receive performance 
or the substitute sum provided in a secondary stipulation. For example, a classic 
liquidated damages clause exists not to deter breach but because the parties 
have agreed to fix in advance the sum payable in case of breach. If there is 
a dispute over whether a clause described as a liquidated damages clause is 
penal, it would not be helpful to consider whether the innocent party would have 
preferred performance. Rather, the focus should be on the value of performance, 
which can then be compared to the quantum of the purported liquidated damages 
clause, and potentially what damages might be available.
In Cavendish, there is some suggestion that the parties’ relative bargaining 
strength may be relevant to determining the legitimacy of an interest. Lord 
Neuberger and Lord Sumption stated that:111
In a negotiated contract between properly advised parties of comparable 
bargaining power, the strong initial presumption must be that the parties 
themselves are the best judges of what is legitimate in a provision dealing with 
the consequences of breach.
On the other hand, Lord Mance seemed to suggest that inequality of bargaining 
power was a factor in determining extravagance, not legitimacy.112 As Palmer 
observed,113 discussion of bargaining power is strangely absent in Paciocco, 
despite the case being about a standard form consumer banking contract.  
Palmer argued “[l]egitimate interests are only those in relation to which a 
court would be likely to grant relief”.114 This means that the rule against penalties 
should knock out as illegitimate a clause requiring disgorgement of profits where 
the facts are not sufficiently close to Attorney-General v Blake,115 or a clause in 
the Ruxley Electronics116 contract requiring the builder to pay the customer a sum 
equal to the cost of cure in the event of non-compliance with the specified depth. 
Palmer’s anchoring of legitimacy to judicial remedies can be reconciled 
with the bargain approach, upon which the remedies available from the courts 
are a useful comparison when determining the legitimacy of an interest.117 
The available judicial remedies are a useful comparison, rather than being 
determinative, because some aspects of the law of contractual remedies can be 
understood as providing default rules for what the parties intended, from which 
reasonable parties might depart. Where that is the case, it is legitimate for parties 
to agree to provide a greater remedy than the default one, just as parties can 
agree to limit or exclude the liability that would normally be available. The only 
111 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [35].
112 Cavendish Square Holding BV v Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67, [2015] 3 WLR 1373 at [152].
113 Jessica Palmer “Implications of the New Rule Against Penalties” (2016) 47(2) VUWLR 305 
at 325.
114 Jessica Palmer “Implications of the New Rule Against Penalties” (2016) 47(2) VUWLR 305 at 
324. This follows from Palmer’s position that the rationale for the rule against penalties is that 
parties cannot agree to remedies that a court does not have the power to grant.
115 Attorney-General v Blake [2000] UKHL 45. This example is from Jessica Palmer “Implications 
of the New Rule Against Penalties” (2016) 47(2) VUWLR 305.
116 Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth [1996] 1 AC 344 (HL).
117 See Jessica Palmer “Implications of the New Rule Against Penalties” (2016) 47(2) VUWLR 
305 at 324: “Terms stipulating remedies must continue to be compared to the remedies that 
would be available from the courts to test whether they are penal or not.”
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qualifier is that they do not go overboard in terms of quantum, which would 
be to move beyond a compensatory purpose. We have already discussed this 
principle in the context of interests that result in no material loss or a loss that 
is difficult to quantify.118 However, aspects of the law of contractual remedies 
that are best understood as limiting recoverable damages to those that are just 
and proportionate119 should be seen as placing hard limits on legitimacy. There 
is, of course, room to argue over which parts of the law of contractual remedies 
provide default rules and which provide hard limits.120
However, Palmer’s approach is not easy to reconcile with the party purposive 
approach of Cavendish and Paciocco. As Kós P put it in Torchlight, following 
those decisions, the question of “what damages [the innocent party] might 
have received had it sued on the primary obligation alone … has only limited 
relevance”.121 In our view, the requirement of legitimacy serves as an important 
control for the party purposive approach. Under the party purposive approach, 
the interests that a party can use to justify a purported penalty are not limited to 
ones that the breaching party has objectively agreed to protect. Neither are they 
limited to interests that the innocent party actually had in mind at the time of 
contract formation.122 Therefore, on the party purposive approach, there is a need 
for a control mechanism so that the innocent party cannot rely on any interest, no 
matter how idiosyncratic or contrary to public policy.123
We suggest that the notion of a legitimate interest in performance probably 
encompasses that the interest must both be reasonable and have some 
reasonable connection to the primary obligation in question.124 In this sense, the 
“reasonableness” of an interest or its connection to the primary obligation is 
assessed by considering whether a reasonable third party would accept that that 
interest is one that the innocent party could reasonably have had, regardless of 
whether or not it was actually protected in the bargain. So, we would suggest, it 
would be illegitimate for an airline to use excess baggage fees as a vehicle for 
raising funds for developing an intercity bus programme. The main reason for the 
illegitimacy here is not that an airline developing a bus service is unthinkable, 
but that there is no reasonable connection between the fact that the customer’s 
baggage is heavier than the allowance and the airline’s desire to launch a bus 
programme. In contrast, a reasonable person might expect that the purchaser of 
a rural property with significant water rights might want to use it to grow grapes, 
and that that objective would be thwarted by a failure to provide the promised 
water rights. And, there is a reasonable connection between a bank receiving 
payment on time and its ability to reinvest that money, and between a car park 
overstay fee and an interest in freeing up car park spaces. 
118 See the discussion above at Part III, C The bargain approach.
119 See David McLauchlan “Remoteness Reinvented?” (2009) 9 OUCLJ 109 at 139.
120 See Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc [2008] UKHL 48 [The Achilleas]; 
David McLauchlan, “Remoteness Reinvented?” (2009) 9 OUCLJ 109; Andrew Robertson 
“The Limits of Interpretation in the Law of Contract” (2016) 47 VUWLR at 200-207.
121 Wilaci Pty Ltd v Torchlight Fund No 1 LP [2017] NZCA 152, [2017] 3 NZLR 293at [96].
122 See discussion above at Part I, C An inquiry into substance. 
123 See Jessica Palmer “Implications of the New Rule Against Penalties” (2016) 47(2) VUWLR 
305 at 323.
124 We say “some reasonable connection” to cast the net wider than reasonable foreseeability in the 
sense of Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341. 
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Turning to the requirement that the interest itself be reasonable it is not 
easy to pinpoint an interest that the innocent party might have that would be 
inherently unreasonable (and accordingly illegitimate), even if it was connected 
to the breach. That is, the innocent party’s motive for the primary obligation 
would have to be unreasonable such that the plaintiff has a legitimate interest 
in performance of the primary obligation but not the fulfilment of their motive. 
Perhaps the customer in Ruxley Electronics,125 who wanted a pool constructed 
to a specific depth for idiosyncratic reasons (rather than any reason intelligible 
to a reasonable person such as that the pool be deep enough to swim or dive in), 
is an example. 
Where this leaves us on the question of legitimacy is that there is no one clear 
identifiable requirement added by the need to identify a “legitimate” interest in 
performance. We suggest that it invites consideration of the link between the 
breach and the agreed remedy, and the inherent reasonableness of the interest 
in question. The latter may simply serve as a control to prevent parties from 
pursuing interests that are clearly contrary to public policy.
iv. conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed the options for New Zealand that arise from 
three recent decisions on the rule against penalties, and which mark a significant 
change in the courts’ approach to the rule. In terms of the engagement question, 
while the United Kingdom and Australia appear to adopt contradictory stances, in 
actual fact their approaches will usually capture the same clauses. The choice for 
New Zealand with respect to that question is easy – the Cavendish formulation 
is simpler and, in substance, is compatible with Andrews. We would word the 
test thus:
A clause engages the rule against penalties if it is, in substance, a secondary 
obligation triggered by the breach of a contractual promise.
With respect to the test question, there are two approaches which differ 
significantly. The broader “party purposive approach” can consider the innocent 
party’s motives and interests for including the clause which are not protected 
in the contract. As long as the innocent party can identify a legitimate interest, 
and the secondary obligation is not disproportionate to this, the clause will 
not be a penalty. Further, any losses that are suffered, however remote, can be 
used to justify the clause. In contrast, the narrower “bargain approach” focuses 
only on the interests that are actually protected in the contract. The choice for 
New Zealand with respect to this question is more difficult – the decision is 
between a test that has overwhelming judicial support, and one that is a better fit 
for contract law.
125 Ruxley Electronics and Construction Ltd v Forsyth [1996] 1 AC 344 (HL).
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